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Abstract
We develop a systematic approach to quantum probability as a theory
of rational betting in quantum gambles. In these games of chance the
agent is betting in advance on the outcomes of several (finitely many)
incompatible measurements. One of the measurements is subsequently
chosen and performed and the money placed on the other measurements
is returned to the agent. We show how the rules of rational betting imply
all the interesting features of quantum probability, even in such finite
gambles. These include the uncertainty principle and the violation of
Bell’s inequality among others. Quantum gambles are closely related to
quantum logic and provide a new semantics to it. We conclude with a
philosophical discussion on the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
1 Quantum Gambles
1.1 The Gamble
The Bayesian approach takes probability to be a measure of ignorance, reflect-
ing our state of knowledge and not merely the state of the world. It follows
Ramsey’s contention that “we have the authority both of ordinary language
and of many great thinkers for discussing under the heading of probability ...
the logic of partial belief” (Ramsey 1926, p. 55). Here we shall assume, further-
more, that probabilistic beliefs are expressed in rational betting behavior: “The
old-established way of measuring a person’s belief ... by proposing a bet, and
see what are the lowest odds which he will accept, is fundamentally sound”1.
My aim is to provide an account of the peculiarities of quantum probability in
this framework. The approach is intimately related to the foundational work on
1Ramsey, 1926, p. 68. This simple scheme suffers from various weaknesses, and better ways
to associate epistemic probabilities with gambling have been developed (de Finetti, 1972). Any
one of de Finetti’s schemes can serve our purpose. For a more sophisticated way to associate
probability and utility see Savage (1954 )
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quantum information by Barnum et al (2000), Fuchs (2001), Schack, Brun and
Caves (2001) and Caves, Fuchs and Schack (2002)..
For the purpose of analyzing quantum probability we shall consider quantum
gambles. Each quantum gamble has four stages:
1. A single physical system is prepared by a method known to everybody.
2. A finite setM of incompatible measurements is announced by the bookie,
and the agent is asked to place bets on possible outcomes of each one of them.
3. One of the measurements in the set M is chosen by the bookie and the
money placed on all other measurements is promptly returned to the agent.
4. The chosen measurement is performed and the agent gains or looses in
accordance with his bet on that measurement.
We do not assume that the agent who participates in the game knows quan-
tum theory. We do assume that after the second stage, when the set of mea-
surements is announced, the agent is aware of the possible outcomes of each
one of the measurements, and also of the relations (if any) between the out-
comes of different measurements in the setM. Let me make these assumptions
precise. For the sake of simplicity we shall only consider measurements with a
finite set of possible outcomes. Let A be an observable with n possible distinct
outcomes a1,a2,...,an. With each outcome corresponds an event Ei = {A = ai},
i = 1, 2, ..., n, and these events generate a Boolean algebra which we shall de-
note by B = 〈E1, E2, ..., En〉. Subsequently we shall identify the observable A
with this Boolean algebra. Note that this is an unusual identification. It means
that we equate the observables A and f(A), whenever f is a one-one function
defined on the eigenvalues of A. This step is justified since we are interested in
outcomes and not their labels, hence the scale free concept of observable. With
thisM is a finite family of finite Boolean algebras. Our first assumption is that
the agent knows the number of possible distinct outcomes of each measurement
in the set M.
Our next assumption concerns the case where two measurements in the set
M share some possible elements. For example, let A,B,C be three observables
such that [A,B] = 0, [B,C] = 0, but [A,C] 6= 0. Consider the two incompatible
measurements, the first of A and B together and the second of B and C
together. If B1 is the Boolean algebra generated by the outcomes of the first
measurement and B2 of the second, thenM = {B1,B2} and the events {B = bi}
are elements of both algebras, that is of B1 ∩ B2. We assume that the agent is
aware of these facts when he is placing his bets.
The smallest nontrivial case of this kind is depicted in figure 1. The graph
represents two Boolean algebras B1 = 〈E1, E2, E3〉, B2 = 〈E1, E4, E5〉 corre-
sponding to the outcomes of two incompatible measurements and they share
a common event E1. The complement of E1 denoted by E1 is identified as
E2 ∪E3 = E4 ∪E5. The edges in the graph represent the partial order relations
in each algebra from bottom to top. A realization of these relations can be ob-
tained by the system considered in Kochen and Specker (1967): Let S2x, S
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x‘, S
2
y ,
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z be the squared components of spin in the x, x‘, y, y‘, z directions of a
spin-1 (massive) particle, where x, y, z and x‘, y‘, z form two orthogonal triples
of directions with the z-direction in common. The operators S2x, S
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y and S
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Figure 1:
commute, and have eigenvalues 0, 1. They can be measured simultaneusly, and
they satisfy S2x + S
2
y + S
2
z = 2I. Similar relations hold in the other triple x‘,
y‘, z. Hence, if we define E1 = {S
2
z = 0}, E2 = {S
2
x = 0}, E3 = {S
2
y = 0},
E4 = {S
2
x‘ = 0}, E5 = {S
2
y‘ = 0} we obtain the two Boolean algebras depicted
in figure 1.
To sum, we assume that when the set of measurementsM is announced the
agent is fully aware of the number of outcomes in each measurement and of the
relations between the Boolean algebras they generate. In the spin-1 case just
considered it means that the agent is aware of the graph structure in figure 1.
We shall refer in short to this background knowledge as the logic of the gamble.
We assume no further knowledge on the part of the agent, in particular, no
knowledge of quantum mechanics. Our purpose is to calculate the constraints
on the probabilities that a rational agent can place in such gambles.
1.2 Methodological Interlude: Identity of Observables and
Operational Definitions
Already at this stage one might object that the identity of observables in quan-
tum mechanics depends on probability. Consider the case of the operators
A,B,C such that [A,B] = 0, [B,C] = 0, but [A,C] 6= 0, and the two in-
compatible measurements of A together with B, and of B together with C. We
are assuming that the agent is aware of the fact that the events {B = bi} are
the same in both measurements. However, the actual procedure of measuring
B can be very different in the two cases, so how is such awareness comes about?
Indeed, the identity criterion for (our kind of) observables is: Two procedures
constitute measurements of the same observable if for any given physical state
(preparation) they yield identical probability distribution over the set of possi-
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ble outcomes2. It seems therefore that foreknowledge of the probabilities is a
necessary condition for defining the identities of observables. But now we face
a similar problem, how would one know when two states are the same? Iden-
tical states can be prepared in ways that are physically quite distinct. Well,
two state preparations are the same if for any given measurement they yield the
same distribution of outcomes. A vicious circle.
There is nothing special about this circularity, a typical characteristic of
operational “definitions” (Putnam, 1965). In fact, one encounters a similar
problem in traditional probability theory in the interplay between the identity
of events and their probability. The way to proceed is to remember that the
point of the operational exercise is not to reduce the theoretical objects of the
theory to experiments, but to analyze their meaning and their respective role in
the theory. In this idealized and nonreductive approach one takes the identity
of one family of objects as somehow given, and proceeds to recover the rest.
Consider how this is done in a recent article by Hardy (2001). Assuming
that the probabilities of quantum measurements are experimentally given as
relative frequencies, and assuming they satisfy certain relations, Hardy derives
the structure of the observables (that is, the Hilbert space). His “solution” to
the problem of the identity of states, or preparations, is simple. He stipulates
that “preparation” corresponds to a position of a certain dial, one dial position
for each preparation. The problem is simply avoided by idealizing it away.
Our approach is the mirror image of Hardy’s. We are assuming that the
identities of the observables (and in particular, events) are given, and proceed to
recover the probabilities. This line of development is shared with all traditional
approaches to probability where the identity of the events is invariably assumed
to be given prior to the development of the theory. It is, moreover, easy to think
of an idealized story which would cover our identity assumption. For example,
in the three operator case A,B,C mentioned above, we can imagine that the
results of their measurements are presented on three different dials. If B is
measured together with A then the A-dial and B-dial show the results; if B and
C are measured together the B-dial and C-dial show the results. Thus, fraud
notwithstanding, the agent knows that he faces the measurement of the same
B simply because the same gadget shows the outcome in both cases.
1.3 Rules of Gambling
Our purpose is to calculate the constraints on the probabilities that a rational
agent can place in a quantum gamble M. These probabilities have the form
p(F | B) where B ∈ M and F ∈ B. The elements F ∈ ∪B∈MB will be called
simply “events”. It is understood that an event is always given in the context of
a measurement B ∈M. The probability p(F | B) is the degree of belief that the
event F occurs in the measurement B. There are two rules of rational gambling,
the first is straightforward and the second more subtle.
2In a deterministic world we would have a different criterion: Two procedures constitute
measurements of the same observable if for any given physical state they yield identical out-
comes. We shall come back to this criterion in section 3.2
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RULE 1: For each measurement B ∈ M the function p(· | B) is a proba-
bility distribution on B.
This follows directly from the classical Bayesian approach. Recall that after
the third stage in the quantum gamble the agent faces a bet on the outcome of
a single measurement. The situation at this stage is essentially the same as a
tossing of a coin or a casting of a dice. Hence, the probability values assigned
to the possible outcomes of the chosen measurement should be coherent. In
other words, they have to satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. The
argument for that is that an agent who fails to be coherent will be compelled by
the bookie to place bets that will cause him a sure loss (this is the “Dutch Book”
argument ). The argument is developed in detail in many texts (for example,
de Finetti, 1974) and I will not repeat it here. Since at the outset the agent
does not know which measurement B ∈M will be chosen by the bookie RULE
1 follows.
RULE 2: If B1,B2 ∈M, F ∈ B1 ∩ B2 then p(F | B1) = p(F | B2).
The rule asserts the non-contextuality of probability (Barnum et al, 2000). It
is not so much a rule of rationality, rather it is related to the logic of the gamble
and the identity of observables (remembering that we identify each observable
with the Boolean algebra generated by its possible outcomes).
Suppose that in the game M, there are two measurements B1,B2 ∈ M,
and an event F ∈ B1 ∩ B2. Assume that an agent chooses to assign p(F |
B1) 6= p(F | B2). A natural question to ask her then is why she assigns F
different probabilities in the two contexts, though she thinks it is the same
event. The only answer consistent with Bayesian probability theory is that she
takes the p(F | Bi) as conditional probabilities and therefore not necessarily
equal. In other words, she considers the act of choosing an experiment Bi (in
stage 3 of the gamble) as an event in a larger algebra B which contains B1,B2.
Consequently she calculates the conditional probability of F , given the choice
of Bi.
There are two problems with this view. Firstly, the agent can no longer
maintain that F ∈ B1 ∩ B2, in fact F is not an element of any of the Bi’s
and can no longer be described as an outcome of a mesurement. Secondly,
the agent assumes that there is a single “big” Boolean algebra B, the event
F is an element of B, and B1,B2 are sub-algebras of B. The trouble is that
for sufficiently rich games M this assumption is inconsistent. In other words,
there are gambles M which cannot be imbedded in a Boolean algebra without
destroying the identities of the events and the logical relations between them.
This is a consequence of the Kochen and Specker (1967) theorem to which we
shall come in (2.2). It means, essentially, that an agent who violates RULE 2, is
failing to grasp the logic of the gamble and wrongly assumes that she is playing
a different game.
Another possibility is that assigning p(F | B1) 6= p(F | B2) indicates that
the agent is using a different notion of conditional probability. The burden
of clarification is then on the agent, to uncover her sense of conditionalization
and show how it is related to quantum gambles. Thus, we conclude that the
violation of RULE 2 implies either an ignorance of the logic of the gamble, or an
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incoherent use of conditional probabilities. It is clear that our argument here is
weaker than the Dutch book argument for RULE 1. A violation of RULE 2 does
not imply a sure loss in a single shot game. We shall return to this argument,
with a greater detail in section 2.2.
Rational probability values assigned in finite games need not be numer-
ically identical to the quantum mechanical probabilities. However, with suffi-
ciently complex gambles we can show that all the interesting features of quantum
probability- from the uncertainty principle to the violation of Bell inequality-are
present even in finite gambles. If we extend our discussion to gambles with an
infinity of possible measurements, then RULE1 and RULE 2 force the proba-
bilities to follow Born rule (section 2.4).
1.4 A Note on Possible Games
A quantum gamble is a set of Boolean algebras with certain (possible) relations
between them. The details of these algebras and their relations is all that the
agent needs to know. We do not assume that the agent knows any quantum
theory.
However, engineers who construct gambling devices should know a little
more. They should be aware of the physical possibilities. This is true in the
classical domain as much as in the quantum domain. After all, the theory of
probability, even in its most subjective form, associates a person’s degree of be-
lief with the objective possibilities in the physical world. In the quantum case
the objective physical part concerns the type of gambles which can actually be
constructed. It turns out that not all finite families of Boolean algebras repre-
sent possible games, at least as far as present day physics is concerned. I shall
describe the family of possible gambles, in a somewhat abstract way. It is a con-
sequence of von Neumann (1955) analysis of the set of possible measurements.
Let H be the n-dimensional vector space over the real or complex field,
equipped with the usual inner product. Let H1, H2, ..., Hk be k non zero sub-
spaces of H, which are orthogonal in pairs Hi ⊥ Hj for i, j = 1, 2, ..., k, and
which together span the entire space, H1⊕H2⊕ ...⊕Hk = H. These subspaces
generate a Boolean algebra, call it B(H1, H2, ..., Hk), in the following way: The
zero of the algebra is the null subspace, the non zero elements of the algebra are
subspaces the form Hi1 ⊕Hi2 ⊕ ...⊕Hir where φ 6= {i1, i2,..., ir} ⊆ {1, 2, ..., k}.
If H,H ‘ are two elements in the algebra let H ∨H ‘ = H ⊕H ‘ be the subspace
spanned by the (set theoretic) union H ∪H ‘, let H ∧H ‘ = H ∩H ‘, and let the
complement of H , denoted by H⊥, be the subspace orthogonal to H such that
H ⊕H⊥ = H. Then B(H1, H2, ..., Hk) with the operations ∨, ∧, ⊥ is a Boolean
algebra with 2k elements. Note that a maximal algebra of this kind is obtained
when we take all the Hi‘s to be one-dimensional subspaces (rays). Then k = n
and the algebra has 2n elements.
Now, let B(H) be the family of all the Boolean algebras obtained from
subspaces of H in the way described above. Obviously, If B1,B2 ∈ B(H) then
B1 ∩B2 is also Boolean algebra in B(H). We shall say that two subspaces G,H
of H are compatible in H if there is B ∈ B(H) such that G,H ∈ B, otherwise
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G and H are incompatible. Two algebras B1,B2 are incompatible in H if there
are subspaces G ∈ B1 and H ∈ B2 which are incompatible.
POSSIBILITY CRITERION: M is a possible quantum gamble if there
is a finite dimensional complex or real Hilbert space H such that M is a finite
family of Boolean algebras in B(H) which are incompatible in pairs.
One could proceed with the probabilistic account disregarding this criterion
and, in fact, go beyond what is known to be physically possible (see Svozil,
1998). We shall not do that, however, and all the games considered in this
paper are physically possible. With each of the gambles to be discussed in this
paper we proceed in two stages. Firstly, we present the Boolean algebras, their
relations and the consequences for probability. Secondly, we prove that the
gamble obeys the possibility criterion.
2 Consequences
2.1 Uncertainty Relations
Consider the following quantum gamble M consisting of seven incompatible
measurements (Boolean algebras), each generated by its three possible out-
comes: 〈E1, E2, F2〉, 〈E1, E3, F3〉, 〈E2, E4, E6〉, 〈E3, E5, E7〉, 〈E6, E7, F 〉, 〈E4, E8, F4〉,
〈E5, E8, F5〉. Note that some of the outcomes are shared by two measurements,
these are denoted by the letter E. The other outcomes belong each to a single
algebra and denoted by F . As before, when two algebras share an event they
also share its complement so that, for example,E1 = E2 ∪ F2 = E3 ∪ F3, and
similarly in the other cases. The logical relations among the generators are de-
picted in the graph of figure 2. This is the compatibility graph of the generators.
Each node in the graph represents an outcome, two nodes are connected by an
edge if, and only if the corresponding outcomes belong to a common algebra;
each triangle represents the generators of one of the algebras.
We assume that the agent is aware of the seven algebras and the connections
between them. By RULE 2 the probability he assigns to each event is indepen-
dent of the Boolean algebra (measurement) which is considered, for example,
p(E2 |〈E1, E2, F2〉 ) = p(E2 |〈E2, E4, E6〉 ) ≡ p(E2). RULE 1 entails that the
probabilities of each triple of outcomes of each measurement should sum up to
1, for example, p(E4)+p(E8)+p(F4) = 1. There are altogether seven equations
of this kind. Combining them with the fact that probability is non-negative (by
RULE 1) it is easy to prove that the probabilities assigned by our rational agent
should satisfy p(E1) + p(E8) ≤
3
2
. This is an example of an uncertainty rela-
tion, a constraint on the probabilities assigned to the outcomes of incompatible
measurements. In particular, if the system is prepared in such a way that it is
rational to assign p(E1) = 1 (see 2.5) then the rules of quantum games force
p(E8) ≤
1
2
.
To see why M represents a physically possible gamble we use the POSSI-
BILITY CRITERION and identify each event with a one dimensional subspace
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Figure 2:
of C3 (or R3) in the following way E1 is the subspace spanned by the vec-
tor (1, 0, 2), E2 ∽ (0, 1, 0), F2 ∽ (2, 0,−1), E3 ∽ (2, 1,−1), F3 ∽ (2,−5,−1),
E4 ∽ (0, 0, 1), E5 ∽ (1,−1, 1), E6 = (1, 0, 0), E7 ∽ (0, 1, 1), F ∽ (0, 1,−1),
F4 ∽ (1,−1, 0), F5 ∽ (−1, 1, 2), E8 ∽ (1, 1, 0). Note that the vectors associated
with compatible subspaces are orthogonal, so that figure 2 is the orthogonality
graph for these thirteen vectors.
A more concrete way to represent this game is to consider each of these
vectors as depicting a direction in physical space. For the vector v let S2v be
the square of the spin in the v-direction of a massive spin-1 particle, so that its
eigenvalues are 0, 1. Now, for each of the thirteen vectors above take the event
{S2v = 0}. Then the relations in figure 2 are satisfied.
This example is a special case of a more general principle (Pitowsky, 1998):
Theorem 1 let H1, H2 be two incompatible rays in a Hilbert space H whose
dimension ≥ 3. Then there is a (finite) quantum gamble M ⊂ B(H) in which
H1, H2 are events, and every probability assignment p for M which satisfies
RULE 1 and RULE 2 also satisfies p(H1) + p(H2) < 1.
2.2 Truth and Probability, The Kochen and Specker’s The-
orem
Consider the gamble M of eleven incompatible measurements, each with four
possible outcomes.
B1 = 〈E1, F1, F2, F3〉, B2 = 〈E1, F1, F4, F5〉, B3 = 〈E1, F2, F6, F7〉,
B4 = 〈E1, F3, F8, F9〉, B5 = 〈E2, F10, F11, F12〉, B6 = 〈E2, F7, F10, F13〉,
B7 = 〈E2, F8, F11, F14〉, B8 = 〈E2, F4, F12, F15〉, B9 = 〈F9, F14, F16, F17〉,
B10 = 〈F5, F15, F16, F18〉, B11 = 〈F6, F12, F17, F18〉
The two outcomes denoted by the letter E are shared by four measurement
each, and the outcomes denoted by F are shared by two measurements each.
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Altogether there are twenty outcomes. This example is based on a proof of the
Kochen and Specker (1967) theorem due to Kargnahan(1994). (The original
proof requires hundreds of measurements, with three outcomes each and 117
outcomes in all). Again, when an event is shared by two measurements then so
does its complement, for example, F 8 = E1 ∪ F3 ∪ F9 = E2 ∪ F11 ∪ F14.
Now, suppose that all the algebras Bk are sub-algebras of a Boolean algebra
B. Assume, without loss of generality, that B is an algebra of subsets of a set
X . With this identification the events Ei, Fj are subsets of X . The logical
relations between the events dictates that any two of the events among the
Ei’s and Fj ’s that share the same algebra Bk are disjoint. Moreover, the union
of all four outcomes in each algebra Bk, is identical to X , for example, X =
E2 ∪ F7 ∪ F10 ∪ F13 is the union of the outcomes in B6. But this leads to a
contradiction because the intersection of all these unions is necessarily empty!
To see that suppose, by contrast, that there is x ∈ X such that x belongs
to exactly one outcome, Ei or Fj , in each one of the eleven algebras Bk. This
means that x belong to eleven such events (with repetition counted). But this
is impossible since each one of the outcomes appears an even number of times
in the eleven algebras, and eleven is an odd number.
One consequence of this is related to RULE 2 discussed in section 1.3. Sup-
pose that an agent thinks about the probabilities of the events Ei, Fj as condi-
tional on the measurement performed. If the term “conditional probability” is
used in its usual sense then the events should be interpreted as elements of a
single Boolean algebra B (taken again as an algebra of subsets of some set X).
To avoid the Kochen Specker contradiction the agent can use two strategies.
The first to take some of the generating events in at least one algebra to be
non-disjoint in pairs, for example, E2 ∩ F8 6= φ. In this case the agent seizes
to see the events E2, F8 as representing measurement outcomes, and associates
with them some other meaning (although he eventually takes the conditional
probability of E2 ∩ F8 to be zero). The other strategy is to take the union of
the outcomes of some measurements to be proper subset of X . For example, in
the case of B9, F9 ∪ F14 ∪ F16 ∪ F17  X . In this case the agent actually adds
another theoretical outcome (which, however, has conditional probability zero).
Both strategies represent a distortion of the logical relations among the events,
which we have assumed as given.
On a less formal level we can ask why would anyone do that? The additional
structure assumed by the agent amounts to a strange “hidden variable theory”
for the set of experiments M. There is a great theoretical interest in hidden
variable theories, but they are of little value to the rational gambler. A classical
analogue would be a person who thinks that a coin really has three sides ‘head’,
‘belly’ and ‘tail’ and assigns a prior probability 1
3
to each. But the act of tossing
the coin (or looking at it, or physically interacting with it) causes the belly side
never to show up, so the probability of belly, conditional on tossing (or looking,
or interacting), is zero. The betting behavior of such a person is rational in the
sense that no Dutch book argument against him is possible. However, as far
as gambling on a coin toss is concerned, his theory of coins is not altogether
rational. It is the elimination of this kind of irrationality which motivates RULE
9
2.
Another consequence of this gamble concerns the relations between proba-
bility and logical truth. Often the Kochen and Specker theorem is taken as an
indication that in quantum mechanics a classical logical falsity may sometimes
be true (Bub, 1974; Demopoulos, 1976). To see how, consider the Ei and Fj as
propositional variables, and for each 1 ≤ k ≤ 11 let Ck be the proposition which
says: “exactly one of the variable in the group k is true”, for example,
C6 = (E2 ∨ F7 ∨ F10 ∨ F13)∧ ∼ (E2 ∧ F7)∧ ∼ (E2 ∧ F10) ∧
∼ (E2 ∧ F13)∧ ∼ (F7 ∧ F10)∧ ∼ (F7 ∧ F13)∧ ∼ (F10 ∧ F13)
Then
∧11
k=1 Ck is a classical logical falsity. But
∧11
k=1 Ck is ‘quantum mechani-
cally true’ with respect to the system described above, because each one of the
Ck’s is a true description of it.
In our gambling picture we make a more modest claim. A rational agent
who participates in the quantum gamble will assign, in advance, probability 1
to each Ck. Therefore, arguably the agent also assigns
∧11
k=1 Ck probability 1.
But this is an epistemic position which does not oblige the agent to assign truth
values to the Ei’s and Fj ’s, nor is he committed to say that such truth values
exist. Indeed, this is a strong indication that ‘probability one’ and ‘truth’ are
quite different from one another. The EPR system (below) provides another
example. There is, however, a weaker sense in which
∧11
k=1 Ck is true and we
shall discuss it in the philosophical discussion 3.1.
The following is a proof that our game satisfies the POSSIBILITY CRITE-
RION. Each Ei and each Fj is identified with a ray (one dimensional subspace)
of C4 (or R4). Two outcome which share the same algebra correspond to
orthogonal rays. The rays are identified by a vector that spans them:
E1 ∽ (1, 0, 0, 0), F1 ∽ (0, 1, 0, 0), F2 ∽ (0, 0, 1, 0), F3 ∽ (0, 0, 0, 1),
F4 ∽ (0, 0, 1, 1), F5 ∽ (0, 0, 1,−1), F6 ∽ (0, 1, 0, 1), F7 ∽ (0, 1, 0,−1),
F8 ∽ (0, 1, 1, 0), F9 ∽ (0, 1,−1, 0), E2 ∽ (1, 1,−1, 1), F10 ∽ (−1, 1, 1, 1),
F11 ∽ (1,−1, 1, 1), F12 ∽ (1, 1, 1,−1), F13 ∽ (1, 0, 1, 0), F14 ∽ (1, 0, 0,−1),
F15 ∽ (1,−1, 0, 0), F16 ∽ (1, 1, 1, 1), F17 ∽ (1,−1,−1, 1), F18 ∽ (1, 1,−1,−1).
2.3 EPR and Violation of Bell’s Inequality
Given two (not necessarily disjoint) events A, B in the same algebra, denote
AB = A ∩ B, and for three events A,B,C denote by {A,B,C} the Boolean
algebra that they generate:
{A,B,C} =
〈
ABC, ABC, ABC, ABC, ABC, ABC, ABC, ABC
〉
In order to recover the argument of the Einstein Rosen and Podolsky (1935)
and Bell (1966) paradox within a quantum gamble we shall use Mermin (1990)
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representation of GHZ, the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (1989) system. Con-
sider the gamble which consists of eight possible measurements: The four mea-
surements B1 = {A1, B1, C1}, B2 = {A1, B2, C2}, B3 = {A2, B1, C2}, B4 =
{A2, B2, C1} each with eight possible outcomes and
B5 =
〈
S, D1, A1B1C1, A1B1C1, A1B1C1, A1B1C1
〉
,
B6 =
〈
S, D2, A1B2C2, A1B2C2, A1B2C2, A1B2C2
〉
,
B7 =
〈
S, D3, A2B1C2, A2B1C2, A2B1C2, A2B1C2
〉
,
B8 =
〈
S, D4, A2B2C1, A2B2C1, A2B2C1, A2B2C1
〉
,
each with six possible outcomes.
Assume that the agent has good reasons to believe that p(S) = 1. Such a
belief can come about in a variety of ways, for example, she may know something
about the preparation of the system form a previous measurement result (see
section 2.5). Alternatively, the bookie may announce in advance that he will
raise his stakes indefinitely against any bet made for S. Whatever the source
of information, the agent has good reasons to assign probability zero to four
out of the eight outcomes in each one of the four measurements B1 to B4. The
remaining events are
in B1 A1B1C1, A1B1C1, A1B1C1, A1B1C1 (1)
in B2 A1B2C2, A1B2C2, A1B2C2, A1B2C2
in B3 A2B1C2, A2B1C2, A2B1C2, A2B1C2
in B4 A2B2C1, A2B2C1, A2B2C1, A2B2C1
Denote by P the sum of the probabilities of these sixteen events. Given that
p(S) = 1 the probabilities of the events in each row in (1) sum up to 1. Al-
together, the rational assignment is therefore P = 4. However, if A1, B1, C1,
A2, B2, C2 are events in any (classical) probability space then the sum of the
probabilities of the events in (1) never exceeds 3. This is one of the constraints
on the values of probabilities which Boole called “conditions of possible expe-
rience”3 and it is violated by any rational assignment in this quantum gamble.
On one level this is just another example of a quantum gamble that cannot be
imbedded in a single classical probability space without distorting the identity
of the events and the logical relations between them. A more dramatic example
has been the Kochen and Specker’s theorem of the previous section.
The special importance of the EPR case lies in the details of the physical
system and the way the measurements B1,B2,B3,B4 are performed. The system
is composed of three particles which interacted in the past, but are now spatially
separated and are no longer interacting. On the first particle we can choose to
perform an A1-measurement or an A2-measurement (but not both) each with
two possible outcomes. Similarly, we can choose to perform on the second
particle one of two B-measurement, and one of two C-measurement on the
third particle. The algebras B1,B2,B3,B4 represent the outcomes of four out
3See Pitowsky (1989, 1994, 2002) and Pitowsky and Svozil, (2001) for a discussion of
Boole’s conditions, their derivations and their violations by quantum frequencies.
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of the eight logically possible combinations of such local measurements. In this
physical arrangement we can recover the EPR reasoning, and Bell’s rebuttal,
which I will not repeat here. The essence of Bell’s theorem is that the EPR
assumptions lead to the conclusion that A1, B1, C1, A2, B2, C2 belong to a
single Boolean algebra. Consequently, the sum of the probabilities of the events
in (1) cannot exceed 3, in contradiction to RULE1 and RULE 2.
Which of two EPR assumptions ‘reality’ or ‘locality’ should the Bayesian re-
ject? In the previous section we have made the distinction between ‘probability
1’ and ‘truth’. But the identification of the two is precisely the subject mat-
ter of EPR’s Principle of Reality: “If without in any way disturbing a system
we can predict with certainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value
of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of reality corresponding
to this physical quantity” (Einstein Rosen and Podolsky, 1935). Quite inde-
pendently of Bell’s argument, a Bayesian should take a sceptical view of this
principle. “Probability equal to unity” means that the degree of rational belief
has reached a level of certainty. It does not reflect any prejudice about possible
causes of the outcomes. On the other hand, there seem to be no good grounds
for rejecting the Principle of Locality on the basis of this or similar gambles.
To prove that this gamble satisfies the possibility criterion let H2 be the two
dimensional complex Hilbert space, let σx, σy be the Pauli matrices associated
with the two orthogonal directions x, y, and let Hx, Hy the (one dimensional)
subspaces of H2 corresponding to the eigenvalues σx = 1, σy = 1 respectively,
so that H⊥x , H
⊥
y correspond to σx = −1, σy = −1. In the eight dimensional
Hilbert space H2 ⊗ H2 ⊗ H2 we shall identify A1 = Hx ⊗ H2 ⊗ H2, B1 =
H2 ⊗Hx ⊗H2, C1 = H2 ⊗H2 ⊗Hx, A2 = Hy ⊗H2 ⊗H2, B2 = H2 ⊗Hy ⊗H2,
C2 = H2 ⊗ H2 ⊗ Hy, all these are four dimensional subspaces. The outcomes
in B1,B2,B3,B4 are one dimensional subspaces, for example A1B2C2 = H
⊥
x ⊗
H⊥y ⊗ Hy. The subspace S is the one dimensional ray along the GHZ state√
1/2 (|+z〉1|+z〉2|+z〉3 − |−z〉1|−z〉2|−z〉3) where z is the direction orthogonal
to x and y. The subspaces Di are just the orthocomplements, in H2⊗H2⊗H2,
to the direct sum of the other subspaces in their respective algebras. Hence,
dimDi = 3.
2.4 The Infinite Gamble: Gleason’s Theorem
Let us take the idealization a step further. Assume that the bookie announces
that M contains all the maximal Boolean algebras in B(H) for some finite di-
mensional real or complex Hilbert space H with dimH = n≥3. Recall that if
H1, H2, ..., Hk are k non zero subspaces of H, which are orthogonal in pairs,
and whose direct sum is the entire space, they generate a Boolean algebra
B(H1, H2, ..., Hk) (section 1.4). If k = n the algebra is maximal and each
subspace Hj is one dimensional. In other words, the set M consists of all non-
degenerate measurements with n outcomes. The information theoretic aspects
of this case are discussed in Caves, Fuchs and Schack (2002)
There is a certain difficulty in extending quantum gambles to this case since
there are a continuum of possible measurements, and the agent is supposed to
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place money on each. We can overcome this difficulty by assuming that the
agent makes a commitment to pay a certain amount on each outcome of each
measurement, without paying any cash in advance. When a single measurement
B ∈M is chosen by the bookie all the agent’s commitments are canceled, except
those pertaining to B.
RULE 1 and RULE 2 imply in this case that for any n orthogonal rays
H1, H2, ..., Hn in H the agent’s probability function should satisfy
p(H1) + p(H2) + ...+ p(Hn) = 1 (2)
Gleason (1957) proved
Theorem 2 Let H be a Hilbert space over field of real or complex numbers
with a finite dimension n ≥ 3. If p is a non negative function defined on the
subspaces of H and satisfies (2) for every set of n orthogonal rays then there is
a statistical operator W such that for every subspace H of H
p(H) = tr(WPH) (3)
where PH is the projection operator on H.
For the proof see also Pitowsky (1998). This profound theorem gives a
characterization of all probability assignments of quantum theory. Furthermore,
if we know that the system is prepared with p(R) = 1, for some ray R, then p is
uniquely determined by p(H) = ‖PH(r)‖
2 for all subspaces H , where r is a unit
vector that spans R. The theorem can be easily extended to closed subspaces
of the infinite dimensional Hilbert space.
It is interesting to note that many of the results about finite quantum gam-
bles that we have considered are actually consequences of Gleason’s theorem.
Consider, for example the Kochen and Specker’s theorem (section 2.2). To con-
nect it with Gleason’s theorem take an appropriate first order formal theory of
the rays of Rn, the orthogonality relation between them, and the real functions
defined on them (where n ≥ 3 finite and fixed). Add to it a special function
symbol p, the axiom that p is non negative, the axiom that p is not a constant,
the axiom that p has only two values zero or one. Now, add the infinitely many
axioms p(H1) + p(H2) + ... + p(Hn) = 1 for each n-tuple of orthogonal rays
in Rn. By Gleason’s theorem this theory is inconsistent (since by (3) p has a
continuum of values). Hence, there is a finite subset of this set of axioms which
is inconsistent, meaning a finite subset of rays which satisfy the Kochen and
Specker’s theorem. This is, of course, a non constructive proof, and an explicit
construction is preferable. However, the consideration just mentioned can be
used to obtain more general non-constructive results about finite games. One
such immediate result is Theorem 1 which also has a constructive proof. (In
fact, the proof of Gleason’s theorem involves a construction similar to that of
theorem 1, see Pitowsky, 1998)
Gleason’s theorem indicates that the use of the adjective ‘subjective’ to de-
scribe epistemic probability is a misnomer. Even in the classical realm it has
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misleading connotations. Classically, different agents that start with different
prior probability assignments eventually converge on the same probability distri-
bution as they learn more and more from common experience. In the quantum
realm the situation is more extreme. For a given a single physical system Glea-
son’s theorem dictates that all agents share a common prior or, in the worst
case, they start using the same probability distribution after a single (maximal)
measurement.
2.5 A Note on Conditional Quantum Probability
Consider two gambles, M1, M2 and assume that A is a common event. In
other words, there is B1 ∈ M1 and B2 ∈ M2 such that A ∈ B1 ∩ B2. We can
consider sequential gambles in which the gambleM1 is played, and subsequently
after the results are recorded, the gamble M2 follows with the measurements
performed on the same system. In such cases the agent can place conditional
bets of the form: “If A occurs in the first gamble place such and such odds
in the second gamble”. This means that the of probabilities assigned in the
second game M2 are constrained by the condition p(A) = 1 (in addition to the
constraints imposed by RULE 1 and RULE 2). The EPR gamble in 2.3 can be
seen as such a conditional game, when we consider the preparation process as a
previous gamble with an outcome S. In fact, all preparations (at least of pure
states) can be seen in that light.
If the gambles M1, M2 are infinite, and contain all the maximal algebras
in B(H), Gleason’s theorem dictates the rule for conditional betting. In the
second gamble the probability is the square of the length of the projection on
(the subspace corresponding to) A. The conditional probability is therefore
given by Lu¨ders rule (Bub, 1997).
3 Philosophical Remarks
3.1 Bohr, Quantum Logic and Structural Realism
The line we have taken has some affinity with Bohr’s approach -or more precisely,
with the view often attributed to Bohr4-in that we treat the outcomes of future
measurements as mere possibilities, and do not associate them with properties
that exist prior to the act of measurement. Bohr’s position, however, has some
other features which are better avoided. Consider a spin-1 massive particle and
suppose that we measure Sz, its spin along the z-direction. Bohr would say that
in this circumstance attributing values to Sx and Sy is meaningless. But the
equation S2x+S
2
y+S
2
z = 2I remains valid then, as it is valid at all times. How can
an expression which contains meaningless (or valueless) terms be itself valid?
Indeed, non-commuting observables may satisfy algebraic equations, the Laws of
4See Beller (1999). Although Bohr kept changing his views and contradicted himself on
occations, it is useful to distill from his various pronouncements a more or less coherent set.
This is what philosophers mean by “Bohr’s views”.
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Nature often take such form. What is the status of such equations at the time
when only one component in them has been meaningfully assigned a value?
What is their status when no measurement has been performed? Quantum
logic, in some of its formulations, has been an attempt to answer this question
realistically.
It had began with the seminal work of Birkhoff and von-Neumann (1936).
A later modification was inspired by the work of Kochen and Specker (1967).
The realist interpretation of the quantum logical formalism is due to Finkelstein
(1962), Putnam (1968), Bub (1974), Demopoulos (1976). Consider, for example,
the gamble B1 = 〈E1, E2, E3〉, B2 = 〈E1, E4, E5〉 made of two incompatible
measurements, with one common outcome E1 (figure 1). Let us loosely identify
the outcomes Ei with the propositions that describe them. The realist quantum
logician maintains that both E1∨E2∨E3 and E1∨E4∨E5 are true, and therefore
so is A = (E1∨E2∨E3)∧ (E1 ∨E4 ∨E5). But only one of the measurements B1
or B2 can be conducted at one time. This means that, generally, only three out
of the five Ei’s can be experimentally assigned a truth value (except in the case
that E1 turns out to be true which makes the other four events false). This does
not prevent us from assigning hypothetical truth values to the Ei’s that make
A true. However, as we have seen in 2.2, the trouble begins when we consider
more complex gambles. To repeat, let M be the gamble of 2.2, and for each
1 ≤ k ≤ 11 let Ck be the proposition which says: “exactly one of the variables
in the group k is true”, for example,
C6 = (E2 ∨ F7 ∨ F10 ∨ F13)∧ ∼ (E2 ∧ F7)∧ ∼ (E2 ∧ F10) ∧
∼ (E2 ∧ F13)∧ ∼ (F7 ∧ F10)∧ ∼ (F7 ∧ F13)∧ ∼ (F10 ∧ F13)
Then B =
∧11
k=1 Ck is a classical logical falsity. This means that we cannot
make B true even by assigning hypothetical truth values to the Ei’s and Fj ‘s.
Still, the quantum logician maintains that B is true. Or, by analogy, that
S2x + S
2
y + S
2
z = 2I is true for every orthogonal triple x, y, z in physical space.
This is the quantum logical solution of the Bohrian dilemma and it comes with
a heavy price-tag: the repudiation of classical propositional logic. But what
does it mean to say that B is true? As I have shown elsewhere (Pitowsky, 1989)
the operational analysis of the quantum logical connectives, due to Finkelstein
and Putnam, leads to a non-local hidden variable theory in disguise. Moreover,
from a Bayesian perspective it is quite sufficient to say that B has probability
1, meaning that each conjunct in B has probability 1 that is, a degree of belief
approaching certainty. Indeed, the Bayesian does not consider even the Laws of
Nature as true, only as being nearly certain, given present day knowledge.
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which A or even B are true, and this is
the sense that enables our Bayesian analysis in the first place. Thus, to assert
that “ (E1 ∨ E2 ∨ E3) ∧ (E1 ∨ E4 ∨ E5) is true” is nothing but a cumbersome
way to say that the gamble M = {〈E1, E2, E3〉 , 〈E1, E4, E5〉} exists. This is
first and foremost a statement about the identities: the outcome E1 is really
the same in the two measurements, and E1 = E2 ∨ E3 = E4 ∨ E5. It is
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also a statement about physical realizations, this gamble can be designed and
played (experimental difficulties notwithstanding). Viewed in this light quantum
gambles together with RULE 1 and RULE 2 form semantics for quantum logic,
in that they assign meaning to the identities of quantum logic (in its partial
Boolean algebra formulation).
The metaphysical assumption underlying the Bayesian approach is therefore
realism about the structure of quantum gambles, in particular those that satisfy
the possibility criterion (1.4). This position is close in spirit (but not identical)
to the view that quantum mechanics is a complete theory, so let us turn to the
alternative view.
3.2 Hidden Variables- A Bayesian Perspective
Consider Bohm’s theory as a typical example5. Recall that in this theory the
state of a single particle at time t is given by the pair (x(t), ψ(x, t)) where x is
the position of the particle and ψ = R exp(iS) -the guiding wave- is a solution
of the time dependent Schro¨dinger’s equation. The guiding condition m
·
x = ∇S
provides the relation between the two components of the state, where m is
the particle mass. The theory is deterministic, an initial position x(0) and an
initial condition ψ(x, 0) determine the trajectory of the particle and the guiding
wave at all future times. In particular, the outcome of every measurement is
determined by these initial conditions.
As can be expected from the Kochen and Specker’s theorem the outcome
of a measurement is context dependent in Bohm’s theory. This fact can also
be derived by a direct calculation (Pagonis and Clifton, 1995). Given a fixed
initial state (x(0), ψ(x, 0)) the measurement of S2z together with S
2
x and S
2
y can
yield one result S2z = 0; but the measurement of S
2
z together with S
2
x‘ and S
2
y‘
can give another result S2z = 1. Now, the identity criterion for observables in
a deterministic theory is: Two procedures constitute measurements of the same
observable if for any given physical state (preparation) they yield identical out-
comes. Therefore in Bohm’s theory the observable “S2z in the x, y, z context” is
not really the same as “S2z in the x‘, y‘, z context”. Nevertheless, the Bohmians
consider S2z as one single statistical observable across contexts. The reason be-
ing that the average outcome of S2z , over different initial positions with density
|ψ(x, 0)|
2
, is context independent. Hence, Bohm’s theory is a hybrid much like
classical statistical mechanics: the dynamics are deterministic but the observ-
ables are statistical averages. Since the initial positions are not known -not
even knowable- the averages provide the empirical content. Consequently, the
observable structure of quantum mechanics is accepted by the Bohmians “for
all practical purposes”.
This attitude prevails when the Bohmian is betting in a quantum gamble.
There is no detectable difference in the betting behavior of a Bohmian agent;
5The uniqueness theorem (Bub and Clifton 1996; Bub 1997; Bub Clifton and Goldstein
2000) implies that all ‘no collapse’hidden variable theories have essentially the structure of
Bohm’s theory.
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although the reasons leading to his behavior follow from the causal structure
of Bohm’s theory. At a first glance there seems to be nothing peculiar about
this. Many people who would assign probability 0.5 to ‘heads’ believe that the
tossing of a coin is a deterministic process. Indeed, there is a rational basis to
this belief: if the agent is allowed to inspect the initial conditions of the toss
with a greater precision he may change his betting odds. In other words, his
0.5 degree of belief is conditional on his lack of knowledge of the initial state.
Obtaining further information is possible, in principle, and in the limit of infinite
precision it leads to the assignment of probability zero or one to ‘heads’. For the
Bayesian this is in a large measure what determinism means.
Can we say the same about the Bohmian attitude in a quantum gamble?
According to Bohm’s theory itself6 the position of the particle cannot be known
beyond the information invested in the distribution |ψ|
2
. Suppose that a particle
is prepared in a (pure) quantum state ψ(x, 0). Then, according to Bohm’s the-
ory, no further information is obtainable by a prior inspection (without changing
the quantum state, in which case the problem starts all over again). Hence, |ψ|
2
is an absolute, not a conditional probability. Consequently, from a Bayesian
perspective the determinism of Bohm’s theory is a myth. Luckily, it does not
lead its believers astray in their bets.
What is the function of this myth? Obviously, to retain a sense of deter-
minism, albeit one which is completely disconnected from human knowledge.
But there is also a subtler issue here that have to do with the structure of the
observables. As we have noticed, for the Bohmian the event E1 = {S
2
z = 0 in
the x, y, z context} is not the same as the event E‘
1
= {S2z = 0 in the x‘, y‘, z
context}. Hence, the gamble M = {〈E1, E2, E3〉, 〈E1, E4, E5〉} is interpreted
by him as being “really” M‘ = {〈E1, E2, E3〉,
〈
E‘
1
, E4, E5
〉
}; although, as a re-
sult of dynamical causes, the long term frequencies of E1 and E
‘
1
happen to be
identical (for any given ψ). It follows that the myth also serves the purpose of
“saving classical logic” by dynamical means (Pitowsky, 1994). Nowhere is this
more apparent than in the EPR case where Bohm’s dynamics violate locality
on the level of individual processes.
In this sense the hidden variable approach is conservative. It is not so much
its insistence on determinism, but rather the refusal to acknowledge that the
structure of the set of events- our quantum gambles- is real. As a gambler the
Bohmian bets as if it is very real; as a metaphysician he provides a complicated
apology.
3.3 Instrumentalism and its Radical Foundations
The Bayesian approach represents an instrumental attitude towards the quan-
tum state. The state is just a code for probabilities, and “probability theory is
simply the quantitative formulation of how to make rational decisions in the face
6Vallentini (1996) considers the possibility that |ψ|2 is only an ‘equilibrium’ distribution,
and deviations from it are possible. In this case Bohm’s theory is a genuine empirical extension
of quantum mechanics, and the Bohmian agent may sometime bet against the rules of quantum
mechanics.
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of uncertainty” (Fuchs and Peres, 2000). Instrumentalism seems metaphysically
innocent, all we are dealing with are experiments and their outcomes, without
a commitment to an underlying, completely described microscopic reality. One
might even be tempted to think that “quantum theory needs no interpretation”
(ibid). Of course, there is a sense in which this is true. One needs no causal
picture to do physics. Like a gambler, the physicist can assign probabilities to
outcomes, assuming no causal or other mechanisms which bring them about.
But instrumentalism simply pushes the question of interpretation one step
up the ladder. Instead of dealing directly with ‘reality’, the instrumentalist
faces the challenge of explaining his instrument, that is, quantum probability.
Unlike other mathematical theories- group theory for example- the application
of probability requires a philosophical analysis. After all probability theory is
our tool for weighing the relative merits of alternative actions and for making
rational decisions; decisions that are made rational by their justifications. In-
deed, we have provided a part of the justification by demonstrating how the
structure of quantum gambles, together with the gambling rules, dictate certain
constraints on the assignment of probability values. The trouble is that these
probability values violate classical constraints, for example Bell’s inequalities.
A hundred and fifty years ago Boole had considered these and other similar
constraints as “conditions of possible experience”, and consequently conditions
of rational choice. Today, we witness the appearance of ‘impossible’ experience.
The Bohmian explains it away by reference to unobservable non-local measure-
ment disturbances. The instrumentalist, in turn, insists that there is nothing to
explain. But the violations of the classical constraints (unlike the measurement
disturbances) are provably real. Therefore, something should be said about it if
we insist that “probability theory is simply the quantitative formulation of how
to make rational decisions”.
Instrumentalists often take their ‘raw material’ to be the set of space-time
events: clicks in counters, traces in bubble chambers, dots on photographic
plates and so on. Quantum theory imposes on this set a definite structure.
Certain blips in space-time are identified as instances of the same event. Some
families of clicks in counters are assumed to have logical relations with other
families, etc. What we call reality is not just the bare set of events, it is this
set together with its structure, for all that is left without the structure is noise.
It has been von Neumann’s great achievement to identify this structure, and
derive some of the consequences that follow from its details. I believe that von
Neumann’s contribution to the foundations of quantum theory is exceedingly
more important than that of Bohr. For it is one thing to say that the only
role of quantum theory is to ‘predict experimental outcomes’, and that different
measurements are ‘complementary’. It is quite another thing to provide an
understanding of what it means for two experiments to be incompatible, and
yet for their possible outcomes to be related; to show how these relations imply
the uncertainty principle; and even, finally, to realize that the structure of events
dictates the numerical values of the probabilities (Gleason’s theorem).
Bohr’s position will not suffice even for the instrumentalists. Their view, far
from being metaphysically innocent, is founded on an assumption which is more
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radical than that of the hidden variable theories. Namely, the taxonomy of the
universe expressed in the structure of the set of possible events, the quantum
gambles which are made possible and the theory of probability they imply,
are new and only partially understood pieces of knowledge. It is the task of
an interpretation of quantum mechanics to make sense of these structures and
relate them to what we previously used to call ‘probability’ and even ‘logic’7.
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